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Can It Be Done, and What Does It Mean If It Can?
John Hadidian, Bernard Unti, and John Griffin
The Humane Society of the United States, Washington, D.C.
ABSTRACT: Differences over what constitutes humaneness in the control of wildlife have traditionally presented a roadblock to
understanding, not to mention agreement, between animal welfare and wildlife damage management professionals. Complaints that
a proposed action or given program is not humane can refer to everything from specific techniques to broader administrative
justifications. A number of concepts have been used to describe welfare standards and measurements, and different assessment
metrics have been developed in attempts to bring objectivity to what might prove, in the end, to be an intractably subjective domain.
Some of the most widely used and serviceable of the concepts intended to operationalize what humaneness is are described and
reviewed here. The need for a more accepted and agreeable framework for humaneness is discussed, and designating “humane” as
a keyword is proposed as one means by which that framework can better realized.
KEY WORDS: animal protection, animal welfare, humane, humaneness, keyword, welfare assessment, welfare criteria
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INTRODUCTION
Although the term “humane” is widely used in both
lay and professional contexts to discuss animal welfare
concerns, it remains relatively ambiguous and difficult to
apply within animal damage management.  To some,
“humane” is simply a subjective and unhelpful term that
largely applies to the feelings individuals express about
the treatment of animals. For others it is associated with
measurable qualities that can provide an empirical
foundation to improve the welfare of individuals and even
populations. The term has a long and evolving history of
use that undoubtedly contributes to the sense of ambigui-
ty some see in it today. Here we examine the term
“humane,” discuss its origins, and explore its relationship
to the science of animal welfare, before moving on to
consider its connection to the broader scope of contempo-
rary animal protection. We argue that an animal protec-
tion perspective transcends the boundary at which animal
welfare concerns typically end.  As a result, what is
humane in animal protection can relate to the operational
principles that guide programs involving animals as much
as the direct impacts to animals themselves. We argue for
the significance of humane as a foundational principle for
animal damage management, value as a keyword, and as
a relevant social construct in this field.
It is particularly important that we consider humane-
ness within the realm of animal management. Although
standards for humane treatment have been widely
codified and enacted in law, there remain significant
inequalities in the treatment of different types and groups
of animals, with so-called “pest” or “nuisance” wildlife
often excluded from the welfare standards applied to pets,
captive animals, or domestic animals used in food
production (Littin et al. 2004).  Some types of wildlife,
such as commensal rodents, are virtually denied consider-
ation when it comes to humane disposition (but see
Mason and Littin 2003 for an exception). Whatever else
it means to people, humaneness does not exist as a
standard or code of practice that is applied uniformly
across species or contexts.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF USE
The term “humane” came into use around 1500 and
for a long time it was simply the synonym for all things
“human.”  John Locke’s (1690) Essay Concerning
Humane Understanding would be quite confusing to
modern readers if not retitled and presented as an essay
concerning human understanding, but for Locke and his
contemporaries that was its meaning all along. By the
mid-17th century the term was being used to describe a
sort of idealized personality type, “the man of feeling.” It
was the Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians who
forged the concept of a “humane person,” someone who
was endowed with innate virtue and whose actions
toward others exemplified deep religious principle and
faith. This was their answer to Thomas Hobbes’ view
that selfishness was the basic motivation of human
behavior; they argued instead that tender benevolence
toward others and responsiveness to their suffering were
the most highly cherished of qualities. Our contemporary
lexical definition still captures this sentiment, defining
humane as “marked by compassion, sympathy or
consideration humans or animals” (Anon. 2014).
By the end of the 18th century the meaning of “hu-
mane” had been extended to a range of charitable
purposes and entities, such as those providing rescue and
relief for victims of drowning and other misfortune;
giving aid to people immersed in poverty; promoting the
abolition of slavery; and providing for the care and
treatment of the insane. In 1770 the Philadelphia
Humane Society was founded, solely with a purpose of
aiding the victims of drowning. The start of the modern
humane movement in the United States can be traced to
the efforts of Henry Bergh, who founded the American
Society of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1866.
By the end of the 19th century the term “humane” had
firmly attached itself to causes related to animals, and
quite often, to children. Today, there are tens of thou-
sands of humane societies globally, including more than
3,500 brick-and-mortar shelters in the United States
handling over 4 million wild and domestic animals each
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year (A. Rowan, Chief International/Science Officer,
Humane Society International, pers. comm.).
As a result, the term “humane” has come to be widely
associated with those agencies and their missions, which
historically placed far greater emphasis on companion
animals and other domestics than on wildlife. It is
important to recall that while 19th and early 20th century
humane advocates had a general concern for wildlife, it
was not a significant focus of their work or thought until
well into the post-World War II period. We are only
beginning to sort out what it means to be “humane” with
respect to our relationship with wild animals.
HUMANE AS KEYWORD
Humane and humaneness are not easy terms to deal
with if one is looking for simple, universally accepted
descriptors. Still, these concepts are an integral part of
the scientific as well as ethical discourse surrounding
human-animal interactions, and are widely used and
consequential in areas involving animals and society.
They are concepts that need to be clarified and better
understood, and the discourse surrounding them broad-
ened. One way to view their utility is as keywords, in the
sense intended by the cultural critic Raymond Williams.
To Williams (1976), keywords are socially prominent
terms that carry a cluster of interlocking yet sometimes
contradictory contemporary meanings, while serving as
building blocks of cultural understanding.  Keywords are
the currency and the terms used to describe important
elements of our lives over whose definitions we may
argue, but whose social relevance is nonetheless never in
question. If we regard language as causative (i.e.,
expressing active meanings and values), these are words
capable of exerting a formative social force (Patterson
2007).
USE AND MISUSE OF THE TERM
In contemporary use, humane can refer either to the
impact an action has on another or how a human observer
feels about that action’s effect on the individual. This sort
of dual meaning is widely referred to in animal welfare
(e.g., Duncan and Fraser 1997, Kirkwood 2013), often
without any reference to the concept of humaneness itself.
There, the concerns may revolve around consideration of
welfare states without allusion to whether particular
actions or someone’s perceptions of them are humane or
not. Regardless, the subjective context in which humane-
ness as a concept is often embedded does not disqualify
the usefulness of the term. In some cases, one might
argue it simply creates another variable that can or must
be addressed.  In others, it sharpens the focus on an
existing concern or perspective.  And finally, it may in
certain instances take over the entire frame of reference,
transforming our overall view of a particular problem,
situation or dilemma.
A certain basic clarity about what is meant by ‘hu-
mane’ is important, of course, given its potential to be
misunderstood and misused. For example, many of the
businesses that engage in “nuisance” wildlife control will
often (and perhaps typically) call the control work they do
humane, even when it involves routinely killing animals
who might otherwise be spared. Sometimes trapping and
killing is unnecessary, as when a wild animal is disturb-
ing accessible trash left out at a curb at night, and that
problem could be solved by simply not placing anything
outside until the morning of collection. The company
contacted about this “problem” stands to earn nothing
from dispensing good advice as opposed to collecting
several hundred dollars to trap and remove the offending
animal, as well as any others attracted to the trap and
caught.  In many jurisdictions, such an animal cannot be
relocated and must be killed if not released on site. The
company argues that it practices “humane” wildlife
control because it uses acceptable euthanasia or killing
techniques to dispatch the animal. Of course, others
would argue that this practice is not humane at all because
the killing itself was unnecessary and did not actually
address the easily resolvable cause of the problem. Then
too, there are a range of contexts that might raise ques-
tions about how animals are treated and the ethics
surrounding our decisions, such as the course of action to
take when animals are using a house to den and give
birth.  The ethical issues raised by these various scenarios
must begin to come into our discussions of the way in
which business is conducted and the role of public
agencies in governing or regulating such activities and
approaches (Griffin et al. 2008).
As another example, we might take the case of animal
protection interests, strong critics of common business
practices within wildlife nuisance control, who lobby for
the use of ‘humane’ traps if control of some kind must
occur.  They typically would mean or understand this
control to involve the use of cage or box-type traps that
capture animals alive. But often those ‘humane’ traps
lead to severe injury or even death, as animals captured
experience stress and distress, physical harm through
injuries such as broken canine teeth, and even agonal
death when left unattended in environmental extremes.
So, one could not simply designate a practice as ‘humane’
without further interrogation or scrutiny, regardless of its
champions.
Clearly, as the prior example demonstrates, the idea of
humane and humaneness can be relative as well as
subjective. This leaves us with an important word with
less than desirable vagueness surrounding it, and, on top
of that, a capacity to be misleading in the important
dialogues we should have about how animals are being
treated. The solution to this problem might lie in consid-
ering and adopting terms and concepts from the science
of animal welfare itself.
ANIMAL WELFARE
Animal welfare science has been a recognized disci-
pline for more than 40 years, first originating from
investigations into the treatment of research and farm
animals (Broom 1986, Rollin 2006). Underlying all
efforts to address the field is the now almost universally
accepted postulate recognizing that animals are sentient
beings capable of suffering in ways that can usually be
empirically identified, and that reducing or eliminating
their suffering is an important concern, at least for most
people. As a nascent discipline, animal welfare suffers
from a lack of strong theory, focused research agendas,
well-defined sub-disciplinary components, and other
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properties found in older fields. Still, the theoretical and
empirical concepts associated with farm and research
animal welfare are far better developed than those we
apply to animals considered to be “pests,” notwithstand-
ing efforts to bring this latter area of concern into better
focus (e.g., Fisher and Marks 1996, Littin and Mellor
2005).
One oft-used definition of welfare describes it as the
state of an individual as it attempts to cope with its
environment (Broom 1986, 1993). Welfare state can be
demonstrated by “indicators” that either show that an
individual has failed to cope or demonstrate the amount
of effort he or she has to make in attempting to cope
(Broom 1988). The idea that individuals will work
toward a goal (e.g., to have access to one type of substrate
as opposed to another) allows welfare preferences to be
tested and brings behavioral criteria into play for indicat-
ing what animals ‘want’ (Dawkins 2004). Other indica-
tors of welfare can be physiological or biochemical, or
include factors such as pathologies, immunosuppression,
reduced fecundity, and lowered survival of offspring,
among others (Mench 1993, Scott et al. 2003, Webster et
al. 2004). It is widely accepted that no single measure is
adequate to characterize what we mean by “welfare” in
animals (Hewson 2003a, Kirkwood 2013, Dawkins
2004), and that considerable ambiguity exists in the
measures sometimes used.  They may not always co-vary,
they can often be difficult to interpret, and they may differ
from one individual or situation to another (Mason and
Mendl 1993).
The understanding of specific biological indicators
and how they affect or influence welfare and help us
cognize poor welfare states is now being complemented
by increasingly rigorous efforts to measure and evaluate
welfare on other scales as well. Much attention has been
given of late to positive states of well-being and how they
might be both qualified and quantified (Green and Mellor
2011). Quality of Life concepts seeking ways to improve
the conditions experienced by animals have most directly
found application in farm and experimental research
contexts but will undoubtedly be extended to other
contexts as well (Scott et al. 2003).
While animal welfare science is not yet rich in theory,
some of its constructs do help to advance practical
approaches to evaluating welfare under real-world
conditions.  Notable among these has been the idea of the
5 freedoms, now more commonly referred to as the 5
domains (Mellor and Reid 1994, Sharp and Saunders
2008).  These are: water deprivation, food deprivation,
malnutrition; environmental challenge; disease, injury,
functional impairment; behavioral or interactive re-
striction; and anxiety, fear, pain, distress.  The first 4 are
representative of an animal’s physical state and the last
represents that animal’s mental status. Again, this last
classification raises an issue of subjectivity, since much of
our effort to account for distress, pain, and suffering in
animals must invoke the experiences the animal is
having, and this is something we can never be sure about
(Dawkins 1990, Duncan 1993). In recent years, the
concept of assessment, applied in various robust forms,
has helped to clarify some of the ambiguity surrounding
welfare criteria.
WELFARE ASSESSMENT
Animal welfare science focuses on several different
ways of objectifying welfare status, broadly classified as
assessments (Hewson 2003b, Dawkins 2004, Broom
2008).  These might range from welfare audits (Mench
2003) to quality assurance (Main et al. 2001) and Quality
of Life (Scott et al. 2003, Green and Mellor 2011)
methodologies, among others. The welfare assessment
that seems most promising and applicable to work with
wildlife is the matrix method developed by Sharp and
Saunders (2008, 2011). Their approach looks at two
matrices designed to deal on the one hand with impacts
that are nonlethal, and on the other with situations where
lethality is involved.  It then ranks different approaches
and techniques along a scale of severity (with respect to
pain or suffering) opposite an axis establishing duration.
Thus, a foot-hold trap that seizes and holds an animal for
eight hours might rank a 4 or 5 on a severity scale, where
a cage-type trap would rank a 2 or 3 for the same period.
But a cage-type trap in which the animal is held for 24
hours, or is held in extremes of heat or cold, would also
achieve higher scores, while a foot-hold that caused major
tissue damage or broke a limb would also go up on a
severity scale.
This assessment scheme works on an a priori basis –
it establishes methodologies and target levels prior to
starting a project in the field and ideally allows the most
humane approach to be adopted. Sharp and Saunders
(2008, 2011) use humaneness as the primary criteria that
the welfare assessment establishes, relying on both
empirical information (e.g., published data on tissue
injury associated with different capture devices) as well
as expert opinion, which is increasingly being used in
animal welfare as an important means of comparing the
consequences of different actions on animal welfare and
coming to reasoned consensus about them (e.g., Webster
et al. 2004, Sharp and Saunders 2011).
FROM ANIMAL WELFARE TO ANIMAL PRO-
TECTION
The concept of humaneness can probably only be
explored in animal welfare up to a point, since welfare
professionals would primarily, if not exclusively, be
interested in an animal’s physical and mental state and
little beyond that. Broom (1986), for example, points out
that welfare concerns usually stop at a point where
consciousness is irrecoverably lost and an animal can no
longer experience pain or distress. Concerns from an
animal protection perspective, however, might extend
beyond the point where the animal no longer is capable of
feeling, to questioning whether and why that condition
was justifiable in the first place. While not a hard and fast
distinction, animal protection interests tend to look at both
the rationale as well as the means by which human
decisions and actions affect animals and engage such
concerns, perhaps more widely via policy discussions and
networks.
This does not mean that concepts in animal welfare
cannot be applied with broad strokes. Porter (1992)
addressed the issue of magnitude of harm in research
animals by referring to both the number of animals that
might be harmed by a particular procedure as well as
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asking about the duration of that harm.  These are
concepts that Kirkwood et al. (1994) applied to wild
animals, with additional factors accounting for the cause
and nature of the harm as well as the capacity of the
animal to suffer.  These approaches allow investigators to
calculate an overall measure of impact that melds
individual-level effects with those involving groups or
populations, something that seems particularly desirable
in wildlife damage management.  Littin et al. (2004) refer
to the “total quantum” of welfare compromise as a way of
characterizing such concerns along a broad spectrum.
This in turn can extend to various operational princi-
ples that deserve to be enumerated and further explored.
A number of scholars have already proposed such
schemas for animal damage management programs
(Braysher et al. 1996, Marks 1999, Mellor and Littin
2004, Littin et al. 2004, Hadidian 2012).  In general, these
are organized around principles such as justification,
benefit-cost evaluation, humaneness, and the evaluation
of results. The idea behind these frameworks is simple
enough: programs that have an impact on wild animals
should be well- justified, minimize harm and suffering,
and strive to deal with the cause and not just the symp-
toms of the problems at issue.
The further concerns of animal protection interests
also typically extend into areas where indirect and
environmental impacts come into play. Protectionists
would address impacts to the non-target victims of
poisons or traps, as might animal welfare concerns, but
the former would also oppose as inhumane the killing of
wolves in wilderness areas to enhance (perhaps) the
growth of elk herds for hunting by recreational sports-
men. The argument that such programs are inhumane
applies more to a debate over justification and benefits
than the question of how wolves are actually killed in the
scenario under consideration.
Such concerns point directly to the need for Standards
of Practice (SOPs) and Best Practices evaluations.  These
would need to address not simply the means by which
control of wildlife as individuals or as populations (and
even species) is conducted.  They would also take on and
account for the degree to which such practices have been
or are justified, and the degree to which they have been
demonstrated as effective and plausible as well. The
application of such standards need not be an all-or-
nothing proposition.  In some instances, approaches based
on the argument from animal welfare may produce
interim solutions to many problems through paradigms
such as the 3 R’s (reduce, refine, replace) as applied
within the wildlife damage management arena (e.g.,
Warburton et al. 2010). It remains to be determined who
would develop such standards. The model proposed by
Sharp and Saunders (2008, 2011) calls for an open
process in which various stakeholders and subject-area
experts and specialists work toward consensus solutions.
In Australia, the federal government’s embrace and
ownership of the issue of animal welfare as embodied in a
national animal welfare strategy (AAWS 2011) has been
productive.  An approach via federal ownership or
guidance is likely to be necessary if anything similar is to
be achieved in the United States.
THE ROLE OF ETHICS
No discussion about humaneness can take place with-
out placing it within the sphere of ethics. Ethical think-
ing, especially admitting that we have a moral obligation
even to ‘pest’ species (Mellor and Littin 2004), should be
a central concern in wildlife damage management (cf.
Schmidt 1989). Littin et al. (2004) propose three
strategies to guide operational actions in the control of
vertebrates: assessing the humaneness of current
methods and adopting the most humane that are usable in
the current instance; mounting an active effort to improve
humaneness of current methods; and following an active
research strategy to develop more humane approaches,
building on preceding research.  Commitments to
strategies such as these would go far to improving the
relationship between animal damage and animal welfare
and protection professionals, not to mention add signifi-
cantly to our understanding of the practice of animal
damage control.
There is an even bigger and broader context to this
type of approach. We are now in an era of intensifying
bio-politics, the practical application of bioethics as it
relates to the status and treatment of all living beings.
The fundamental practical, policy, and legislative
decisions we take concerning animals of all species, their
well-being and protection, and their continued use or non-
use, are going to unfold on a dynamic landscape that
won’t look like the one we’ve been operating on for so
many years.  An emerging literature in political philoso-
phy focuses on what governments may owe to animals,
and on what political duties might ensue from animal
ethics. This discussion represents a shift away from
moral theory and goes toward discussion of the relational
obligations involving humans and animals. There is more
to it than just leaving them alone. Our social and political
institutions, practices, and policies will all have to
accommodate their presence and take account of their
needs and their well-being. So this scholarship challeng-
es us to consider and acknowledge that all of our human
institutions must be engaged in working out the implica-
tions and the practicalities of right behavior toward
animals (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, Cochrane 2012,
Smith 2012, Garner 2013). One set of authors working in
this area suggest that we characterize animals via three
categories that would help to determine the nature of the
laws and policies and practices that should protect them.
It is a kind of group-differentiated approach, in which
domestic animals are accorded a kind of adjusted co-
citizenship in which their best interest and preferences are
taken into account; wild animals are granted a kind of
sovereignty in the areas in which they live, enough to
sustain their well-being and flourishing;  and “liminal”
animals (such as mice, pigeons, and insects) would be
treated as denizens of the cities and the environments in
which they live, the environments they share with us
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).
All of these thinkers are trying to come to terms with
the important question of whether, how, and which
animals, if any, may be considered members of the liberal
social contract, the community that we all inhabit
together. They all believe that the political morality of
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our treatment of animals, the political disposition of
animal issues, should come together with our practical
work, to design institutions that protect animals as
dependent members of our society, the society they too
inhabit.  And that promises to make of our shared world a
more fitting home for both humans and nonhuman
animals alike.
CONCLUSION
Stafleu et al. (1996) addressed the problem of defining
animal welfare by recognizing three levels at which
definition can be addressed: the lexical, the explanatory,
and the operational.  The lexical or dictionary definition
gives the concept its common meaning; the explanatory is
intended to serve as “elementary theoretical background”
for the phenomena under study; the operational definition
sets the “concrete parameters” that allow the concept to
be quantified and operationalized. Humane and humane-
ness are concepts deserving of the same treatment. The
role of humaneness in wildlife damage management has
only recently begun to be addressed seriously, despite
having been first raised as a concern more than two
decades ago (Schmidt and Bruner 1981). Our operational
definition of humaneness posits that it is an attempt to
maximize an animal’s welfare state. It is around this
premise that we hope and anticipate the flow of discus-
sion in wildlife damage management circles will extend
in the years ahead.
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